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Abstract 
This paper discusses the main issues and driving forces of government policies in the area of risk 
management  in  agriculture,  with  particular  emphasis  on  good  policy  practices  and  the  international 
environment. Four main ideas are developed. First, good policy and good policy analysis requires a holistic 
approach. This is particularly so in this policy area because risks interact prominently with both farm 
household strategies and government programs and regulations in terms of risk reduction impacts and the 
development of market tools and strategies. Second, the rational for government actions which are based 
on market failure or equity concerns need to be defined in order to analyze its nature and scope, as well as 
to develop appropriate government measures. Third, the context of all support measures to agriculture must 
be  considered  because  there  are  potential  risk-related  effects  associated  with  most  forms  of  support, 
particularly  in  OECD  countries  with  high  level  of  support  to  agriculture.  Fourth,  risk  management 
measures need to comply with international agreements, particularly the Agreement on Agriculture of the 
World Trade Organization. Implications for good policy in this area have already been drafted by OECD 
and are useful for policy analysis.   3 
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AND RISK MANAGEMENT: A HOLISTIC APPROACH 
Introduction  
Agricultural  production  is  subject  to  many  uncertainties.  Any  farm  production  decision  plan  is 
typically associated with multiple potential outcomes with different probabilities. Many events related to 
weather, market developments and other hazards cannot be controlled by the farmer but have a direct 
incidence on the returns from farming. In this context, the farmer has to manage the risk in farming as part 
of his whole management of the farming business. 
Many risks directly affect farmers´ production decisions and welfare. In response to the potential 
impact of these uncertain events farmers implement diverse risk management strategies in the context of 
his particular production plan, his portfolio of financial, physical and human capital, and his degree of 
aversion to risk. These risk management strategies may include decisions on-farm, changes in portfolio 
structure, use of market instruments, government programs, and diversification to other source of income. 
Indeed, many general agricultural support policies have risk management implications and interfere with 
risk  management  decisions.  In  addition,  some  governments  implement  specific  agricultural  risk 
management policies on the basis of efficiency or equity rationales. The complexity of these interactions 
requires that governments make significant efforts for coherence, particularly among different policies and 
between policies and the development of market strategies. Agricultural risk is an interrelated “system” in 
which markets and government actions interact with risks and farmers’ strategies. Government programs 
may underpin the development of market strategies, but they may also crowd out market developments or 
on-farm strategies. The result of these interactions is the set of risk management strategies and tools that is 
available  and  used  by  farmers.  The  available  strategies  are  not  the  simple  addition  of  government 
programs, market instruments and on-farm decisions; they are all mutually interdependent. 
Figure 1: Some interactions in an agricultural risk management system 
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The objective of this paper is to analyse the context in which risk management strategies take place, 
taking  into  account  the  whole  set  agricultural  policy  interventions  that  have  implications  on  risk 
management. All these policy actions are constrained by international agreements. This paper will also 
emphasise some good policy principles. The first section describes the main elements of agricultural risk 
management systems. Section 2 develops the ideas on the possible role of government and the economic 
rationale behind. Section 3 describes the context of agricultural policies in OECD countries. Section 4 
emphasises  the  constraints  imposed  by  WTO  agreements.  Finally,  section 5  summarises  some  OECD 
policy guidelines in this area. 
1. Agriculture risk management “systems” 
A  risk  management  system  is  composed  of  many  different  sources  of  risk  that  affect  farming, 
different risk management strategies and tools used by farmers, and all government actions that affect risk 
in farming. Each risk may be dealt with a specific management tool or strategy. Each strategy availability, 
development and use is determined to a great extent by government actions. Some government actions are 
specifically designed to deal with some risk faced by farmers, and many actions have a direct impact on 
farming risk even if not specifically designed to do so. That is, a risk management system is characterized 
by a set of complex relations among three different axes that involve the original sources of risk, the 
available tools and strategies and government measures (Figure 2). The simultaneous determination of the 
elements in these axes generates an identification problem when analyzing risk management. When certain 
events or measures of variability of relevant farming variables are observed, they cannot be dissociated 
from the actions taken by the farmer to manage risk. Furthermore, these actions and observed variability 
are also directly determined by many government measures and regulations that affect both farming risk 
and  available  risk  management  tools.  When  some  variability  of  farm  income  is  measured,  it  already 
includes the impacts of the risk management strategies and government programs in place.  
Figure 2: Three axes and the identification problem 
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Sources of risk in agriculture and relevant characteristics of some of these risks. 
The idea of risk is associated with an event that implies some loss or damage and that can occur with 
some  probability.  It  implies  the  existence  of  some  uncertainty  but,  unlike  this  latter,  the  term  “risk” 
emphasises  the  loss  or  negative  part  of  the  uncertainty.  Sometimes  these  two  terms  are  used  as 
differentiated: risk implies the knowledge of some probabilities associated with an uncertain event, while 
uncertainty is applied to situations in which the probabilities are not known. However, this distinction is 
artificial since rarely is the probability distribution associated with some risk known with precision. Risk is 
typically measured through an indicator of dispersion or variability of a relevant farming variable. When 
this variability is measured on the basis of time series information or historical data, appropriate statistical 
techniques are required to disentangle the variability of values from the time trend of these values. Farmers 
need to manage or mitigate risk as measured by variability through different instruments, but they must 
adjust to trends and changes in the economic environment and in main farming variables.  
Any classification of risk in agriculture is arbitrary. Boundaries between different sources of risk are 
often  blurred.  Five  main  sources  of  risk  can  be  retained  from  the  literature  (Harwood  et  al,  1999): 
production, markets, finance, institutions, and other. Production risks are associated with all events that 
make final production outcome uncertain when production decisions are taken. They include most climatic 
events, such as floods or droughts, pests and diseases, and any other hazardous events that may affect 
yields in agriculture or production from livestock. Market risk refers to uncertainties associated with prices 
of inputs and outputs. It also includes any other uncertainties from the markets such as the conditions 
imposed by the contractors. Financial risk is associated with the variability of interest rates or of the value 
of financial assets, and the availability of credit when required. Risks associated with farm property or 
physical  capital  could  also  be  considered  under  this  same  category.  Institutional  risk  is  increasingly 
considered as an important source of risk in farming. This includes all types of government actions and 
regulations that can affect the returns from farming. Changes in policies and laws such as environmental 
requirements generate institutional risk. A final group of sources of risks could be considered covering 
environmental risks, health-related risks and liability risk associated with the legal responsibility of farmers 
in relation to their production.  
All these types or sources of risk have impacts on farm households’ welfare through the effects they 
have on income and wealth. The magnitude of those impacts depends on the characteristics of those risks 
and the way they enter into the income / wealth equation of the farmers. Risks can be characterised by the 
frequency of their occurrences and by the magnitude of the associated losses. More generally, risks are 
characterised by the whole distribution of risky events that include information on both the probabilities 
and the magnitude of the impacts of the events. One main characteristic of risk is its correlation with 
respect to other sources of risk. For instance, it is frequent that the output price is imperfectly negatively 
correlated  with  yields.  Accounting  for  this  type  of  correlation  is  essential  in  developing  good  risk 
management strategies at the farm level and good policy practices. 
It is often argued that not all types of risk are equal. For instance, it is said that downside risk is more 
relevant  for  decision-making  than  upside  risk.  This  way  of  using  these  concepts  as  alternative 
characteristics of risk is misleading. In fact, up-side and down-side risks are two sides of the same coin: a 
risk is in the up or down side in relation to the level used as the reference (the mean, the median, the 
mode…). Whatever the reference used, downside risk could not exist without some corresponding upside 
risk. More useful is the concept of downside risk as risk that has some asymmetries in its distribution, 
being skewed to the lower values. This situation is frequent in agricultural production risk. Yields tend to 
depend  on  variables  such  as  average  temperature  and  rainfall  in  a  way  that  deviations  from  optimal 
temperature or optimal rainfall have negative impacts on yields, whatever the direction of the deviation. 
Under these circumstances, the distribution of yields tends to be biased towards the lower values and yields   6 
that are more likely to be below, or far below, its value during a “normal” season, than above or far above 
this value. 
A risk is systemic if it affects simultaneously a large number of farmers in the same geographical 
region. On the contrary, a risk is idiosyncratic if it affects only a single farmer. The spectrum in-between 
these two extremes of individual idiosyncratic un-correlated risk and systemic perfectly correlated risk is 
wide. In general, production risk tends to be more idiosyncratic while price risk tends to be systemic. The 
term catastrophic risk is usually applied to risks that have a very low probability of occurrence but very 
large associated losses. When the term “catastrophic” is applied at a regional or national level it requires 
also  some  correlation  across  farmers  in  the  region;  that  is,  some  systemic  nature.  In  this  sense,  a 
catastrophic event must be infrequent and severe for a region or country.  
Farmers’ strategies 
Farmers take actions to manage their risk for two main reasons. First, there are costs associated with 
risk (e.g. financial) or impacts on expected production and costs due to non-linerities of these functions 
(Just,  1975).  Second,  farmers  can  be,  and  usually  are,  risk  averse;  that  is,  they  dislike  risk  and  take 
measures and actions that help them to prevent, mitigate, or cope with risk. But this behaviour vis-a-vis 
risk events is not exclusive of farmers. All individuals –whatever their economic activity- take decisions to 
manage their own risk. 
The  first  set  of  possible  strategies  is  based  on  the  appropriate  portfolio  of  financial  assets  and 
economic activities of the household, and it is not exclusive to the farm households. The most obvious 
strategies  used  across  board  in  different  households  and  activities  are  related  to  the  management  of 
finances of the farm and the household. Good financial management can ensure appropriate liquidity in the 
case  of  a  hazardous  event  that  may  affect  consumption  possibilities.  Farm  households  –as  any  other 
household - can also diversify their sources of income not only with different products on the farm, but 
also with different sources of off-farm income. To the extent to which these other sources of income or 
wealth are not correlated with the returns from the farming activity, these strategies contribute to reduce 
the overall risk of the household.  
There are also on-farm strategies that have the potential to reduce farming risk. Different production 
techniques, particularly the appropriate use of inputs such as fertilizers or irrigation, can generate different 
degrees of variability in yields and outcomes. Diversification or rotation in production can also contribute 
to the stability of returns.  
Farmers can sometimes opt for different ways of marketing their production. Vertical coordination or 
different  forms  of  contracting  can  contribute  to  reduce  risk  on  prices  and  industry  requirements. 
Cooperatives or other arrangements among producers can also contribute to reduce some market risks. 
There are private markets in which specific agricultural risk can be pooled and/or shared amongst 
different agents. Different types of risk may generate different types of market solutions. For instance, 
production  risk  –  that  has  a  large  idiosyncratic  component  -  tends  to  be  managed  through  insurance 
contracts, while price risk –which are typically highly correlated across producers and even regions - is 
dealt with future contracts. Insurance companies pool the production risk of different producers and then 
share this risk with their shareholders. There is private insurance for specific events, such as hail, in most 
countries. However, multi-peril crop insurance is rarely available without government subsidies. Future 
markets,  when  available,  provide  a  possibility  of  hedging  agricultural  prices  through  standardised 
contracts. These contracts do not cover all price risks faced by an individual farmer, and there is always 
some “basis” risks for the farmer. More sophisticated options and derivatives markets associated with the 
futures are generally available.    7 
Finally, farmers may count on government programs or actions in order to manage their risk. Some of 
these actions are found in the context of or coordinated with market instruments. Some are specific to 
agriculture, while others are more general. Some focus on risk reduction, while others provide just support. 
Furthermore,  uncertainties  about  government  actions,  both  in  terms  of  programs  and  in  terms  of 
legislations that affect farming, can contribute to generate additional risk. The possibility of a change in the 
environmental legislation or on the agricultural support programs generates some risk that directly affects 
farming.  
Government action and institutional framework  
General economic policy is the first, and probably most important, government action to facilitate 
appropriate risk management. A good business and economic environment contributes to the development 
of  different  market  solutions  for  risk  pooling  and  risk  sharing  and  for  good  financial  management. 
Macroeconomic stability and a secure legal framework are the basis for the development of both farming 
businesses and markets for agricultural related risk. The proper functioning of markets for inputs and 
outputs, including credit, constitutes a good framework that farmers and other agents can use to manage 
their risk. 
General  social  and  fiscal  policies  in  OECD  countries  generate  a  system  of  income  smoothing 
normally  attached  to  tax  systems  and  safety  nets  provided  by  social  programs.  Sometimes,  farming 
activities are subject to different provisions than other economic sectors both in terms of the fiscal or social 
security systems. This special treatment can have an impact on the capacity of those systems to deal with 
risks from farming. For instance, very generous taxing systems for farmers may jeopardize the income 
smoothing  role  of  income  taxes,  and  taxing  systems  based  on  calculated  income  from  modules  may 
eliminate this income smoothing role. 
Agricultural  support  policies,  even  if  not  oriented  to  reduce  risk,  have  a  significant  role  in  risk 
management. Many OECD countries support their farmers with different policy measures. These policy 
measures generate an additional source of income that may reduce the risk exposure and the vulnerability 
of  farmers.  When  the  level  of  support  is  large,  there  may  be  smaller  incentives  to  implement  risk 
management strategies or to participate in risk related markets.  
Some agricultural support instruments and mechanisms are directly designed to affect risk or the 
availability of risk management tools. This is the case of deficiency payments and counter-cyclical support 
measures, or insurance subsidies. Farmers can benefit from the use of these instruments in two ways: 
getting the support that they involve in terms of current and expected transfers,  and profiting the risk 
reduction that they may involve. Many of these measures interact with other measures, particularly with 
on-farm strategies and market tools. Government programs can potentially crowd out the development of 
appropriate market tools or on-farm strategies.  
Finally, government is responsible for laws and regulations that directly affect farming activities, with 
potential  impact  on  the  costs  and  returns.  These  include  legislation  in  areas  such  as  food-safety, 
environment, labour,  and land. Government  sometimes  also intervene in the  development  of  different 
institutional arrangements. For instance, most countries providing insurance subsidies, such as Spain or the 
United States, facilitate the creation of agricultural insurance consortiums or of some of the standards in 
the design of the insurance policies, or even some institutional arrangement between private companies and 
government subsidy rules, that may affect the development of the insurance market beyond the effects of 
the subsidy.  
Another area in which institutional arrangements are influenced by government action and that are 
crucial for the risk management environment is catastrophic risk. Most governments take some ex post   8 
action whenever a catastrophic event has occurred. Some governments have rules in order to decide what 
constitutes  a  catastrophic  risk  and  what  type  and  size  of  action  is  appropriate.  There  is  usually  an 
institutional  arrangement  that  involves  farmers,  independent  agencies,  local  governments  and  national 
government. This arrangement determines who takes the initiative and how this initiative or request for 
catastrophic  agricultural  aid  is  pursued.  There  are  also  countries  in  which  no  formal  institutional 
arrangement is foreseen and decisions on whether and how to provide catastrophic aid are made ex post in 
an ad hoc manner. These arrangements, lack of arrangement, or government ad hoc responses contribute to 
defining the responsibilities for managing important types of risks.  
The  main  elements  in  terms  of  sources  of  risk,  management  strategies  and  government  actions 
explained in this section are listed in Table 1. These lists are drafted independently with no intention of 
ordering or highlighting any specific relationships among elements of different lists.  
Table 1: Lists of main sources of risk, management strategies and government actions 
Sources of risk  Risk management strategies  Government actions / framework 
 
Production 
 
Market  
 
Financial  
 
Institutional risk 
 
Other sources of risk 
 
 
On-farm production techniques 
 
Market tools: insurance, futures… 
 
Savings, credit and off-farm assets 
and income 
Government programs  
 
Marketing 
 
 
Business and economic environment 
 
Social and fiscal policies 
 
Generic agricultural support 
 
Risk-related agricultural programs 
 
Regulations and institutions 
Source: OECD Secretariat 
2. Is there a role for Government?  
It is tempting to think that risk is always bad because it can frustrate the expectations of consumption 
or well-being of farm-households. However, this idea is misleading because there are often some agents in 
the economy – some of them farmers - who can benefit from risk because they took the right combination 
of risks. This incentive can be an important engine for good schumpeterial entrepreneurship, looking for 
opportunities that need an incentive to be discovered. Farming, as well as other sectors and the economy as 
a whole, can benefit from this entrepreneur activity that can be driven by incentives or higher returns 
attached to some risks. There is no economic justification for trying to “eliminate” the risks, but rather to 
facilitate mechanisms to manage these risks. Efficient mechanisms should help to select the risks that are 
covered, according to their associated costs and benefits for the economic agents and society as a whole. 
Market Failure 
There are strong arguments in the literature in favour of a role for the government in the area of risk 
management  in  agriculture.  The  first  set  of  arguments  is  related  to  the  lack  of  efficiency  of  market 
mechanisms in order to allocate resources for risk management in agriculture. This efficiency argument is 
based on the possibility of market failure in agricultural risk management markets. If markets depart from 
the perfect competitive ideal, market equilibrium fails to be Pareto optimal.  
The departure from competitive markets may be due to the existence of externalities or public goods. 
There are not many risks that have clear externalities attached except for risks from epidemic diseases that 
can affect other plants or animals, or for catastrophic events that can affect the possibilities of quick   9 
recovery  of  a  country  or  a  region  and  the  well  functioning  of  the  economy.  In  both  cases,  efficient 
government action should be able to keep the appropriate incentives for farmers to take risk management 
decisions. 
The existence of market power is also a possible departure from competitive markets. It can occur that 
crop  insurance  markets  are  very  concentrated  with  few  companies  able  to  collude.  Government 
institutional arrangements could facilitate the interaction and communication among insurers, increasing 
the possibilities for non-competitive behaviour. 
However,  the  departure  from  competitive  markets  that  has  potentially  more  significance  for  risk 
management is the existence of asymmetric information. If the farmer can hide some of his actions so that 
these  cannot  be  observed  and  incorporated  into  the  insurance  contract  conditions,  there  exists  moral 
hazard. Once insured, farmers have reduced incentives to take proper care of his production. Moral hazard 
may cause an insurance market to fail. Additionally farmers can sometime hide some information that is 
relevant for insurance. In this case the insurer is not able to distinguish between “risky” farmers and “non-
risky” farmers. This inability to separate the contracts for farmers with different risks or characteristics 
implies  the  existence  of  adverse  selection:  more  risky  farmers  have  larger  incentives  to  contract  an 
insurance policy than less risky farmers. This can also cause markets to fail. 
In addition to the adverse selection or moral hazard phenomena, systemic risks such as production 
risk typically presents high transactions costs of reinsurance. It is expensive to find agents willing to take 
the risks associated to a large portfolio of farmers’ policies whose risks are very much correlated. These 
high transactions costs can also make markets fail to meet demand and supply for risk management tools.   
In the absence of full costless contingency markets for agriculture, risk averse farmers are likely to 
produce below the optimum. However, this does not automatically imply there is a need for government 
action. The main objective of improving efficiency in risk management in agriculture and in the economy 
as a whole requires answers to the following questions: Is risk in agriculture higher than in other sectors? Is 
the  absence  of  contingency  markets  deeper  than  in  other  sectors?  Is  government  intervention  cost 
effective? What kind of intervention could better contribute to improve efficiency in risk management? 
Equity 
The second set of arguments in favour of government intervention in agriculture risk management is 
based on equity considerations. Government may decide to help farmers in situations of economic or social 
distress derived from some type of hazardous events. There are general instruments from social policy that 
can be applied to farmers. Some of them have specificities for farmers. There are also often agricultural 
specific measures that are taken ex post in order to help “poor” farmers adjust after a shock. However, if 
the purpose is to help to adjust from a sudden hazard that risks bringing household consumption levels 
towards poverty, the criterion for such aid to be delivered should be proximity to the poverty line, and it 
should be referred to all farm household income. This type of welfare measure may not be appropriate to 
address structural poverty that may require longer run policies.  
Some implementation issues  
Some relevant implementation questions arise whenever some policy action is being developed for 
risk management. First, policy makers should focus their attention on the shocks to individual income or to 
individual variability rather than on aggregate measures of risk or variability. This is important not only for 
the variance but also for the covariance between different risks affecting farm income, such as prices and 
yields. Looking at individual indicators allows to identify the population that suffers from risk and the   10 
scope of this suffering. There is a role for academic research to advance in this area to better understand 
the linkages between individual and aggregate risks and variability.  
For sudden effects that are infrequent but severe – what is normally called catastrophic events - there 
is a debate on the convenience of ex ante or ex post action. Ex ante programs fix rules on triggering 
variables, values or events and on the amounts of aid. Ex post actions imply an ex post discretionary 
decision on whether the event deserves disaster aid, what amount and with what criteria.   
Information is the key element that may impede markets to work. There is potential for government 
action to improve the availability of such information and to reduce the information asymmetries. There 
may also be scope for government action in the area of training to familiarize farmers with the main 
instruments and tools that he can potentially use. 
Government actions would better be oriented to contribute to the creation or enhancement of markets 
for risk management tools and other risk management strategies. General support programs have an impact 
on  risk  management  but  are  not  well  targeted  to  that  objective.  Any  evaluation  of  possibilities  for 
government  action  needs  to  account  for  the  interaction  with  other  government  programs,  market 
mechanisms and different sources of risk.  
3. The context of domestic support to agriculture in OECD countries  
Any government initiative on the area of risk management in agriculture needs to account for the 
current context of existing support measures in OECD countries. The Producer Support estimate (PSE) of 
the OECD is the international standard for measurement of this support. The categories of measures in the 
OECD classification follow implementation criteria (Table 2). Even if they do not include categories that 
are  specificate  to  group  risk  related  measures,  there  are  many  risk  related  support  measures  that  are 
included under different categories.  
Table 2: Classification of Agricultural Support according to the OECD 
Support to producers (Producer Support Estimate, PSE) 
  A1) Market price support (MPS): Qs * (Ps - Pw)   
  Budgetary payments (based on implementation criteria): 
A2) Payments based on Output  
B) Payments based on input use 
C) Payments based oncurrent A/An/R/I, productionrequired 
D) Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, production required 
E) Payments based on non-current A/An/R/I, production not required 
F) Payments based on non-commodity criteria 
G) Miscellaneous Payments 
  A/An/R/I = Area, Animal numbers, Receipts or Income   
General services to the sector (GSSE)  
  R&D, schools, inspection, infrastructure, marketing/promotion, public stockholding, miscellaneous 
Total Support Estimate (TSE)= PSE + GSSE + Consumer subsidies 
 
Figure 3 presents the percentage PSE in a selection of OECD countries. This indicator represents the 
percentage of farm recipts that are due to agricultural support measures. On average, 29% of farmers’ 
receips in OECD countries are due to government policies. This number is above 55% for countries such 
as Japan, Korea and Switzerland, 34% for the European Union, and 14% for the United States. These   11 
indicators include, amongst other policies, market price support (MPS) provided through border measures 
and payments based on output. In fact, these two categories of support are directly coupled to production 
and continue to represent– on average - more than half of total support in OECD countries.  
Figure 3: %PSE in selected OECD countries 2004-06 
 
Market price support and payments based on output often have a countercyclical nature with respect 
to prices. Border measures generate price gaps between domestic and international prices and they are 
often complemented with variable intervention measures linked to administrative intervention prices. This 
provides stability in domestic prices. Many payments based on output in OECD countries are deficiency 
payments that cover the difference with respect to a target price. The two most important examples in this 
respect are the European Union which where large proportions of support continue to be given as market 
price support, and the United States that has significant programs of a deficiency payments type. Given the 
amount of this type of support and its share on total support, this is probably the main risk reducing set of 
measures in place in OECD countries (OECD, 2004).  
Several OECD countries (Spain, Mexico, Japan, US and Canada) provide crop insurance subsidies in 
different forms and with differing scopes. Countries implementing revenue insurance programs are less 
numerous (some Canadian provinces and the US). These payments are classified in the PSEs as payments 
based on variable inputs or as payments based on area, depending on the implementation rules. 
Some OECD countries provide payments based on revenue or income “losses”. This is the case of the 
Canadian CAIS program and the United States Counter-cyclical payments program that was the successor 
of the market loss assistance payments provided since 1998. The Mexican ASERCA marketing payments   12 
program is based on a so-called target income, but is in fact a kind of deficiency payment per unit of 
output. 
Other countries have safety nets types of measures of different types. There are systems based on 
savings such as the former NISA in Canada and the Managed Deposit Scheme in Australia. There is 
transitional  assistance  for  farmers  leaving  the  sector  in  some  countries  (Australia,  Ireland,  Korea)  or 
welfare assistance for farmers having temporal difficulties in the context of a disaster (Australia). Finally, 
there are income smoothing taxation systems in several countries, such as Australia and Sweden.  
Most countries have some kind of “disaster” payments triggered by natural catastrophes. For instance, 
drought and disaster assistance based on losses exist in, for example, Canada and Mexico. Other countries 
contribute with some public money to disaster funds to be triggered when a calamity occurs (France). 
Many countries (particularly national expenditure of members of the European Union, but also Japan) 
provide  interest  concessions  in  an  ad  hoc  basis  after  a  disaster. There  are  also  several  countries  that 
consider high energy prices as a “shock” that requires some compensation from public money (several EU 
member plus Mexico and Japan).  
Current or recent agricultural policy developments and debates follow different directions in terms of 
risk management. For instance, the discussions on the 2008 Farm Bill in the United States point in the 
direction of continuing and reinforcing the counter-cyclical nature of an important part of the payments. 
Discussions in Canada follow the same direction even if less oriented to commodity specific programs. On 
the  contrary,  the  discussion  around  the  European  Union’s  common  agricultural  policy  is  much  more 
oriented to reinforcing the decoupled nature of the main support measures. 
4. PSE support affects risk and has a risk related response 
All PSE support measures affect risk and has risk related responses and effects (OECD, 2001). Even a 
program that has genuine “decoupled” income support to farmers would have an impact on farm household 
income.  This,  in  turn,  will  imply  an  income  effect  in  labor  /  leisure  decisions  and  wealth  effects  in 
production for risk averse farmers (Henessy, 1998). Many government regulations (such as environmental 
laws), input subsidies and general services affect yield variability and, therefore, variability of receipts and 
income. Coupled support always affects farm receipts and input use, and therefore production variability. 
Some  measures  in  all  categories  have  explicit  stabilizing  mechanisms  (intervention  price,  deficiency 
payments, stabilization payments, crop and revenue insurance, countercyclical measures…). Furthermore, 
all policy measures potentially generate some policy risk or uncertainties about future changes in policy.   13 
Figure 4: an example of estimated production impacts of risk averse farmers 
US coarse grains producers, 2001 
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Source: OECD, 2004. 
OECD  (2004)  estimated  the  impacts  on  variability  of  aggregate  receipts  of  different  aggregate 
categories of PSE support measures. It was found that most PSE categories reduce aggregate revenue 
variability. Particularly, market price support was found to reduce variability in all the cases that were 
analyzed.  However,  variability  reduction  is  not  proportional  to  the  amount  of  support  and  there  are 
payments and programs that have more risk reduction effects than others. This reduction in risk implies 
risk-related response and effects in production as illustrated in Figure 4. Insurance effects can be dominant 
for categories of support that are more decoupled from production and have relatively smaller price effects. 
The interaction among policy measures has proved to be very significant (OECD, 2005). In general, 
risk reducing payments crowd-out the use of market strategies, particularly if they cover the same source of 
risk or risks that are highly correlated. There can be perverse effects of risk reducing support that ends up 
increasing farmer´s income variability, particularly when other substituting risk related programs, tools or 
strategies are in place or can be used by farmers. These results underline the strong need to co-ordinate all 
risk reducing measures and to evaluate their impact on other tools and strategies. 
5. The international context: WTO boxes and notifications  
Policy measures related to agricultural risk management, like any other agricultural support measure, 
need to comply with the rules fixed for domestic support in pillar 3 of the agreement on agriculture of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). There can be measures of this type in any of the three boxes: amber 
box  of  measures  that  potentially  distort  trade,  blue  box  direct  payments  under  production  limiting 
programs, and green box so-called minimally distorting measures. There can also be measures that are 
notified under the de minimis commodity and non commodity specific support up to 5% of value of 
production.  
Green box measures have to comply with the basic criterion of having “…no, or at most minimal, 
trade-distorting effects or effects on productions”. There are also specific criteria for different categories of 
measures, some of which are related with risk management, particularly three: decoupled income support,   14 
income  insurance  /  safety  net,  and  natural  disasters  /  crop  insurance.  Of  course,  the  measures  under 
“Decoupled income support” have important risk management implications, in principle related with the 
corresponding wealth effects and the financial management of the farm household. Up to now, the main 
user of this category is the United States. Its Direct Payments program is declared under this category. It is 
likely that the European Union will make large use of this category for the Single Payment Scheme in 
future notifications. Around 6% of all green box support notified to WTO belongs to this category (Anton, 
2007).  
The category “Government participation in income insurance and income safety net programs” is 
hardly used, with around 0.1% of notified support. Among OECD countries, Australia has notified its Farm 
Management Deposit Scheme, but with no payment made since the support component of this program is 
due to taxing provisions. Canada notified Alberta Farm Income Disaster Program and Prince Edward 
Island its Agricultural Disaster Insurance Program. Non-OECD countries have used this category for a 
diversity of programs, some of them related to crop insurance; Argentina, support for compulsory hail, 
work accident and life insurance (special tobacco fund) and the creation of a solidarity  fund for hail 
insurance coverage (since 1997); Costa Rica: Insurance services, including crop insurance; India: Crop 
Insurance  Scheme  and  Farm  Management  Deposit  Scheme  (no  payment  made);  Sri  Lanka:  Income 
Insurance and Income Safety Net Program.  
“Payments  for  relief  from  natural  disasters  (including  participation  in  crop  insurance  schemes)” 
includes 2% of all green support notified to WTO. Among the notifications there are mainly disaster 
payments of different kinds (Table 3). Some of them are programs targeted to specific farmers in need after 
a  disaster  (e.g. Australian  Exceptional  Circumstances  Relief  Program),  but  most  of  them  are  broader 
compensation to farmers after the occurrence of a disaster.  
However, the main insurance subsidy programs in the United States, some European Union countries 
like Spain, Canada, and to lesser extent Japan, are not declared under this green box category but under the 
non-commodity specific de minimis. The main impediment that many countries may have found to declare 
their insurance programs under the green box is due to the first specific criterion demanded for this type of 
support: the requirement of a formal recognition by government authorities of a natural disaster, and a 
production loss of 30% with respect to preceding three years average or five-year olympic average. The 
draft  modalities  in  agriculture  in  the  Doha  Round  Negotiations  (WTO,  2008)  include  a  revision  of 
paragraph 8  of  Annex 2,  which  refers  to  this  category  of  measures.  This  new  draft  implies  different 
requirements for direct disaster payments as compared with participation in insurance programs. For the 
latter no formal recognition of disaster by the government is required and the 30% loss triggering level is 
required to be based on the average production in a period demonstrated to be actuarially appropriate. The 
new draft also includes a third type of program under this same category: destruction of animals or crops to 
control or prevent pests and diseases.    15 
Table 3: Notifications from OECD countries in the green box under category “Relief from natural disasters 
(including participation in crop insurance schemes)” 
Country  Programs 
Australia  Rural Adjustment Scheme 
Tropical fruit producer assistance (1996) 
Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment 
contribution to regional Disaster fund 
interest subsidies (State funding) 
European Union  Compensatory payments in respect of weather, restoration of agricultural potential and 
natural disasters (re-plantation of olive grove in 96) 
Hungary  Compensation of damage caused by drought 
Japan  Subsidy on agricultural insurance premium; natural disaster relief loans 
Korea  Compensatory payments for losses caused by natural disaster 
New Zealand  Administrative cost of providing advisory services to farmers affected by drought and 
paying army personnel for the distribution of water to farm households 
Norway  Compensation for crop damage due to natural disaster 
Poland  Protection against and relief from flood and restoration of agricultural production 
Slovak Republic  Partial damage reimbursement 
Slovenia  Compensation for production losses caused by disaster 
United States  Non-insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP);  
compensation for feed or forage losses, for loss of tree seedlings, for livestock losses; 
emergency loans 
Source: WTO Notifications 
In addition to the insurance subsidy programs, other programs from OECD countries directly related 
with  risk  management  are  notified  under  de minimis.  The  United  States  has  declared  Multiyear  Crop 
Disaster  Payments  and  Crop  Market  Loss  Assistance  payments  and  their  inheritor  Counter-Cyclical 
Payments program. These latter are payments based on historical land, but counter-cyclical with current 
crop  prices.  Canada  has  also  notified  under  de minimis  its  former  Net  Income  Stabilisation  Account 
(NISA) program.  
6. Guiding Policy Conclusions  
Strategies to reduce income risk depend on the characteristics of risk and require an integrated set of 
tools and instruments. According to OECD (2000) the role for the government in risk management is: to 
provide a sound business environment with competitive markets and clear regulations; to facilitate the 
development of market mechanisms; and when markets fail, to provide instruments according to reform 
principles.  These  OECD  reform  principles  are:  intervention  should  be  effective  and  cost-efficient, 
minimally distorting, delivered in a transparent, decoupled and targeted way  without undermining the 
development of private/market solutions, or hindering the adjustment capacity of the sector, or encouraging 
rent seeking (limit moral hazard/adverse selection). 
Hence the need to have an integrated approach to risk management systems becomes evident. The 
interaction among risks, strategies and interventions is critical. However, this seems not to be the case in 
most OECD countries where policies have sometime contradictory objectives, most support is linked to 
production and ad hoc intervention often gives farmers contradictory incentives.   16 
There is a need for more information on the mechanisms available, their utilization and performance, 
and the assessment of their economic impacts. The existence of Market Failure and /or specify equity 
concerns need to be analysed and assessed. There is a role for academic research on this area.  
Other roles for government include training, development of information sources that may reduce 
information asymmetries in risk related markets, and ensuring an appropriate integration between private 
and public initiatives. Sharing of policy experiences among different countries can also be an important 
source of knowledge and policy improvements. 
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